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John Quiggin  
S ince the beginning of systematic microeconomic reform in the early 1980s, there has been a steady flow of official and unofficial predictions that the improvement in productivity made by possible by reform would yield 
improved living standards for all, or at least most, Australians.  The first such 
predictions were made by Kasper et al. (1980) who estimated that the adoption of 
a program of microeconomic reform broadly similar to that subsequently 
implemented would result in annual growth in income per person of 3.8 per cent 
for the period 1975–2000, while continuation of past policies would yield annual 
growth of 1.7 per cent.  The implied cumulative net impact of reform was an 
increase in income of more than 70 per cent.   
Subsequent estimates of the benefits of reform, mostly made by government 
agencies, including the Bureau of Industry Economics (1990), the Economic 
Planning Advisory Council (1996), Filmer and Dao (1994) and the Industries 
Assistance Commission (1989), were more modest, but still substantial.  The most 
widely quoted was the estimate made by the Industry Commission (1995) that the 
implementation of ‘Hilmer and related reforms’ would yield medium-term 
benefits equivalent to a permanent increase in GDP of 5.5 per cent.  This estimate 
covered a broad range of reforms, including competitive tendering and 
contracting, regulatory reform in a number of industries and restructuring of 
government business enterprises.  Although the time-scale for the realisation of 
benefits was not entirely consistent, the majority of the benefits were projected to 
be realised over a period of five years.  The estimates excluded a number of major 
reforms that took place during the 1990s including reductions in tariffs, labour 
market reform and privatisation of public utilities. 
The estimates listed above covered overlapping sets of reform initiatives and 
time periods.  However, they all implied that the benefits of microeconomic 
reform would be equivalent to an increase of at least one percentage point in the 
growth rate of GDP, and most were presented as partial or conservative.  It 
therefore seems reasonable to summarise the conclusions of these studies by 
saying that the program of microeconomic reform commencing in the early 1980s 
was expected to raise the medium-term growth rate of GDP by between one and 
two percentage points.   
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Microeconomic Reform Outcomes 
Predictions can be debated indefinitely, but after two decades of reform it seems 
reasonable to focus on observed outcomes.  Within a few years of the onset of 
microeconomic reform, supporters of reform began to look for, and frequently 
claimed to have found, evidence of the benefits of reform both in individual 
sectors and for the economy as a whole. 
The first important piece of microeconomic reform in the 1980s was the 
deregulation of the financial sector.  Supporters of this reform pointed to benefits 
in two main areas.  First, the growth of financial takeovers, promoted by 
‘entrepreneurs’ such as Alan Bond, John Elliott, Robert Holmes a Court, 
Christopher Skase and John Spalvins, was interpreted, following the arguments of 
Manne (1965), as creating a market for corporate control and promoting more 
efficient allocation of resources.  Bishop, Dodd and Officer (1987:80) concluded 
that the activities of ‘raiders’ such as the Bell Group (controlled by Holmes a 
Court), Bond Corporation (Bond), Elders (Elliott), and Adelaide Steamship 
(Spalvins) ‘lead to more profitable uses of company assets, and as such they play a 
vital role in the capital allocation process’. 
Second, the successful management of the ‘banana republic’ crisis of 1986, 
which included large, but temporary, increases in interest rates, was interpreted as 
evidence that the economy had become more ‘flexible’ in its response to economic 
shocks. 
A widely noted assessment, was that of Higgins (1989:x) 
 
We have had a decade of remarkable and fundamental economic and 
social policy reform; reform which in all its major contours and, 
arguably, in 99 per cent of its detail, is efficiency-enhancing.   
 
Higgins echoed the views of Henderson (1989) who judged that:  Australia 
had gone further in reducing fiscal imbalance and distortions in the tax system 
than most OECD countries; was among the leaders in financial market 
liberalisation and trade liberalisation; and was a model in the transparency of its 
assistance measures.  A similar assessment was offered by Sieper and Wells 
(1989). 
Among other things, the optimistic view of the benefits of reform reflected in 
Higgins’ assessment was used to justify the maintenance of high interest rates 
during 1989, as a response to inflationary pressures and current-account problems.  
The resulting recession showed that the economy was not as flexible as had been 
hoped.  It also led to the bankruptcy of most of the leading ‘entrepreneurs’, 
exposing a pattern of bad investment decisions and dubious financial 
manipulations, which cast doubt on claims about the efficiency-enhancing 
properties of takeovers.  Critics, such as Mathews (1991:7) blamed 
microeconomic reform for the severity of the recession, stating that ‘the economy 
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has been brought to its knees by financial and economic deregulation, the 
elimination of tariffs, free trade in agriculture [and] privatisation’.1 
During the early 1990s — a period of high unemployment and relatively slow 
economic recovery — fewer claims were made regarding the macroeconomic 
benefits of microeconomic reform.  Rather, attention was focused on the concept 
of multifactor productivity (MFP), which is discussed in more detail below. 
Although optimistic claims about productivity outcomes had been made from 
the late 1980s onwards, the Industry Commission took a more cautious view.  In 
its 1995-96 Annual Report, however, the Commission was willing to claim a 
measure of success (Industry Commission, 1996:3): 
 
There are early signs that past reforms are contributing to a structural 
improvement in Australia’s productivity performance.  In contrast to its 
poor relative performance previously, Australia’s productivity increased 
at twice the rate of the OECD between 1989 and 1994 ...  To sustain this 
momentum, it is important to lock in the gains from past reforms and 
seek further improvements in efficiency. 
 
The estimated annual rate of total factor productivity growth between 1989 
and 1994 was 1.1 per cent, compared to 0.5 per cent for the OECD as a whole. 
The claim that the benefits of reform were already evident has been made 
with increasing confidence since the mid-1990s.  However, there has been a subtle 
shift in the nature of the claims put forward.  The Industry Commission (1996) 
presented the period 1989–94 as one of recovery from a previous trend of weak 
and deteriorating productivity growth.  By contrast, in more recent assessments of 
microeconomic reform, the period of decline has been extended into the early 
1990s, and it has been argued that strong productivity growth did not commence 
until 1993-94.  Since the benefits of higher productivity growth flow through to 
higher living standards with a considerable lag, there is an element of ‘always jam 
tomorrow, never jam today’ in these shifting timeframes. 
Multifactor Productivity 
The need to focus on multifactor productivity may be understood in the light of 
critical responses to official estimates of the likely benefits of microeconomic 
reform As Forsyth (1992) pointed out in his discussion of the Industries 
Assistance Commission (1989), this study, like most predictions of the benefits 
from microeconomic reform, incorporated the assumption that capital stock would 
grow substantially, either through increased foreign investment or through 
increased domestic saving.  Since this additional capital input would have to earn 
                                                     
1  Note that neither critics nor supporters of microeconomic reform gave any credence to 
the revisionist view, popular in the late 1990s, that microeconomic reform did not really 
get under way until after 1990. This view has some validity in relation to labour markets, 
but is otherwise inconsistent with the historical record. 
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the rate of return to capital determined by world markets, estimates of increases in 
GDP overstate the increase in economic welfare associated with the predicted 
outcomes.   
A related point was made by Quiggin (1997) who argued that many of the 
reforms analysed by the Industry Commission (1995) were associated with 
increases in the pace and intensity of work.  Thus, the benefits of increased output 
were achieved at the cost of increased effort by workers.  A correct assessment of 
the welfare benefits of the predicted outcomes would take this cost into account. 
The point common to the objections made by Forsyth and Quiggin is that a 
benefit is not necessarily associated with increasing output if this increase is 
accompanied by a proportional increase in inputs.  Increasing the use of inputs is 
beneficial only if it is achieved through bringing unemployed workers into the 
labour force or through the use of unemployed, and immobile, capital and 
resources.  A crucial element of the microeconomic reform debate, however, has 
been the view that short-term concerns about employment should be subordinated 
to longer-term measures designed to increase productivity. 
For most purposes, then, the most appropriate measures of the economic 
benefits of microeconomic reform are measures of productivity, that is, the ratio of 
output (as measured, say, by GDP) to some appropriately-chosen index of inputs 
of labour and capital.  Such measures are typically referred to as measures of 
‘multifactor productivity’ or ‘total factor productivity’ to distinguish them from 
partial measures of the productivity of individual inputs such as labour and land.   
An important problem in analysing productivity is the need to distinguish 
underlying productivity trends from cyclical fluctuations.  Productivity tends to 
decline or grow slowly during recessions because firms hoard labour and keep 
capital partially or completely idle.  In the early stages of a recovery, rapid growth 
can be achieved simply by making full use of existing capacity.  During an 
expansion phase, technical innovations and new enterprises that could not be 
financed in a recession may be implemented, yielding further productivity gains.  
Hence, productivity is generally pro-cyclical.  The simplest, and generally most 
appropriate, response to this problem is to measure productivity over the course of 
an entire business cycle, usually from peak to peak or from trough to trough. 
Multifactor Productivity Estimates 
Although various measures of economic performance have been used to support 
claims of improved economic performance in the 1990s, the most important are 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) estimates of multifactor productivity growth 
(ABS, 1998; 1999; 2000).  Experimental ABS statistics on multifactor 
productivity growth, published in 1999, suggested that the period since 1993-94 
was one of historically unprecedented productivity growth.  Most notably, capital 
productivity that until the 1990s had consistently declined in line with neoclassical 
models of the implications of capital deepening, was estimated to have increased 
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Although revised estimates of multifactor productivity growth were published 
in 1999, the revision did not receive the wide publicity given to the original 
estimates.  Some commentators, including Kasper (2000), have continued to rely 
on the original estimates.  Others, including Snape (2000), have presented the 
revised data, but have adhered to judgements formed on the basis of the original 
data.  Hence, to understand the development of the debate, it is necessary to look 
at both sets of estimates. 
Table 1:   Original ABS Estimates of Multifactor Productivity Growth 
 Rate of growth of 
Year 
ending 
June 
Market 
output 
Labour 
input 
Labour 
productivity
Capital 
input 
Capital 
productivity
Multifactor 
productivity 
1965–69 5.1 2.5 2.5 7.0 -1.9 1.3 
1969–74 4.5 1.6 2.9 6.0 -1.5 1.6 
1974–82 2.1 -0.3 2.4 3.9 -1.8 1.3 
1982–85 2.0 -0.4 2.2 3.8 -1.8 1.2 
1985–89 4.3 3.2 0.9 4.0 0.3 0.8 
1989–94 1.8 -0.2 2.0 2.6 -0.8 1.1 
1994–98 4.6 1.7 3.1 3.8 0.8 2.4 
1965–74 4.8 2.0 2.7 6.5 -1.7 1.5 
1981–89 3.3 1.7 1.5 3.9 -0.6 1.0 
1989–98 3.0 0.6 2.5 3.1 -0.1 1.7 
1965–98 3.4 1.0 2.4 4.4 -1.0 1.4 
Source:  ABS (1998) and author’s calculations. 
 
The initial ABS estimates are presented in Table 1.  Column 1 gives time 
periods, consisting of one or more productivity cycles, as defined by the ABS (see 
below).  The data are derived from the national accounts and therefore refer to 
financial years.  For example, the first row, listed as 1965-69, refers to the four-
year period from 1964-65 (the year ending June 1965) to 1968-1969 (the year 
ending June 1969).  All growth rates are computed from ratios of annual values in 
the same fashion as annual growth rates computed on a ‘year-to-year’ basis.  For 
example, if Y denotes market output, the growth rate for Y in Column 1 is given 
by:   
 G = (Y69/Y65)1/4–1 ≈  (ln Y69 – ln Y65)/4 ≈  (Y69/Y65-1)/4   
 
where Y65 denotes the year 1964-65, Y69 denotes the year 1968-69, ln is the 
natural logarithm and ≈ denotes approximate equality. 
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Column 2 shows the annual growth rate of market sector output.  Column 3 
shows the annual growth rate of labour input, measured in hours.  Column 4 is 
equal to the difference between Columns 2 and 3, and is the standard measure of 
labour productivity.  Column 5 is the rate of growth of capital services, and 
Column 6 the associated measure of capital productivity.  Column 7, the 
multifactor productivity growth measure, is the difference between the rate of 
growth of output and the rate of growth of an input index in which capital and 
labour inputs are weighted according to an estimate of their share in total input 
costs.  More detail on the derivation of multifactor productivity measures is given 
in ABS (2000). 
Rows 1 to 6 show the results for the six productivity cycles identified by the 
ABS between 1964-65 and 1993-94.  Row 7 (in bold) shows the ‘productivity 
miracle’ supposed to have taken place between 1993-94 and 1997-98.  Rows 8 to 
10 have been derived by combining ABS productivity cycles to correspond more 
closely to business cycles (see below).  Row 11 shows the results for the entire 
data period. 
Although the rate of growth of market sector output from 1993-4 to 1997-8 
was no greater than in the period from 1964-65 to 1972-73, the estimated rate of 
multifactor productivity growth was substantially higher.  On the basis of this 
evidence, Parham (1999:vii) concluded that ‘Australia’s productivity performance 
is now at an all-time high.  Productivity growth is faster now than in the so-called 
“Golden Age” of growth around the 1960s.’  
Quiggin (1999a, 2000) presented a number of objections to the ABS 
estimates.  One of these objections was that the apparent improvement in capital 
productivity was inconsistent with the weak investment reflected in the slow rate 
of growth of capital inputs.  A genuine increase in the productivity of capital 
should increase the number of projects with a positive present value and, 
therefore, raise the level of investment.  An increase in measured productivity 
combined with weak investment is more consistent with a cyclical recovery in 
capacity utilisation. 
Revised ABS data released in 1999 raised the estimated rate of growth of 
capital inputs for the 1980s and 1990s and largely resolved this issue (see Table 
2).  The estimated rate of capital productivity growth was revised down to –0.3 per 
cent (Table 2, Row 7), better than the historical average, but not startling for an 
expansion.  According to the revised data, productivity growth since 1993-94 has 
been only modestly better than that of the ‘golden age’ ending in 1973-74 (an 
annual rate of 1.7 per cent since 2000 compared to an average of 1.3 per cent in 
the ‘golden age’), rather than clearly superior as was the case with the original 
estimates. 
Another noteworthy feature of the revised data in Table 2 relates to the period 
from 1988-1989 to 1993-1994 that, at the time, was regarded as providing 
evidence that microeconomic reform was beginning to yield productivity benefits.  
According to the revised estimates, multifactor productivity growth in this period 
was near the all-time low reached in the immediate aftermath of financial 
deregulation and lower than in any period before the onset of microeconomic 
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reform.  However, as discussed below, this result is sensitive to cyclical timing.  
For the period 1989-1990 to 1993-1994, the growth rate of MFP was 0.9 per cent, 
while for the period from 1983-1984 to 1989-1990, the rate was only 0.2 per cent.  
Thus, a different choice of cyclical timing would give more support to the 
hypothesis of an improvement in performance. 
Table 2:  Revised ABS Estimates of Multifactor Productivity Growth 
 Rate of growth of 
Year 
ending 
June 
Market 
output 
Labour   
input 
Labour 
productivity 
Capita
l input 
Capital 
productivity 
Multifactor 
productivity 
1965–69 5.1 2.5 2.5 6.3 -1.1 1.1 
1969–74 4.6 1.6 2.9 5.5 -0.9 1.5 
1974–82 2.1 -0.3 2.4 4.0 -1.8 1.0 
1982–85 1.8 -0.4 2.2 3.7 -1.8 0.8 
1985–89 4.2 3.2 0.9 4.6 -0.4 0.4 
1989–94 1.8 -0.2 2.0 3.4 -1.5 0.6 
1994–00 4.8 1.7 3.1 5.1 -0.3 1.7 
1965–74 4.8 2.0 2.7 5.9 -0.9 1.3 
1982–89 3.2 1.7 1.5 4.2 -1.0 0.7 
1989–00 3.1 0.6 2.5 4.2 -1.0 1.2 
1965–00 3.4 1.0 2.4 4.3 -1.1 1.1 
Source:  ABS (2000) and author’s calculations 
 
The second objection to claims of a productivity ‘miracle’ put forward by 
Quiggin (1999a) relates to cyclical timing.  As noted above, the standard 
procedure in assessing economic performance over time is to compare cycles on a 
peak-to-peak or trough-to-trough basis.  Since the 1990s expansion did not peak 
until late 2000, only recent analysis using peak-to-peak comparisons avoids the 
possibility of bias in favour of the null hypothesis that performance in the 1990s 
has been no better than in the past.  However, any such bias would be small, and, 
in any case, conservatism is appropriate in testing hypotheses of fundamental 
economic change. 
The literature on recent productivity growth in Australia includes a range of 
cyclical comparisons, most of which are biased in favour of the hypothesis of a 
productivity miracle.  Parham (1999) focuses on a ‘productivity cycle’ from June 
1994 to June 1998, identified by the ABS on the basis of internal characteristics of 
the time series of multifactor productivity estimates.  As shown in Tables 1a and 
1b, the ABS identified four productivity cycles in the period since June 1982, 
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corresponding fairly closely to the two business cycles (from mid-1982 to late 
1989 and from late 1989 to the present) evident in data on GDP, unemployment 
and other macroeconomic data.   
To apply a peak-to-peak approach, it is necessary to estimate the timing of 
cyclical peaks.  One approach is based directly on the ABS productivity data.  The 
market sector data presented in Tables 1a and 1b show that the productivity cycles 
since 1981-2 fall into pairs.  The 1982–5 and 1989–94 cycles, both of which 
include severe recessions, display low growth in inputs and outputs, particularly 
labour.  The 1985–89 and 1994–00 cycles, both of which occurred during 
economic expansions, show strong growth in outputs and labour inputs.  The two 
productivity cycles of the 1980s and the 1990s each correspond fairly closely to a 
single business cycle.   
Data limitations and the weakness of the business cycle during the ‘golden 
age’ create some problems for the assessment of the period before 1973-74.  
Contemporary assessments suggest that, following the mild recession of 1960-61, 
the 1960s were a period of uninterrupted expansion.  For this reason, rows 8, 9 and 
10 in Tables 1a and 1b show the effect of combining pairs of productivity cycles 
into three business cycles, namely 1964-65 to 1973-74, 1981-2 to 1988-9 and 
1989-90 to 1999-2000. 
As shown in Table 1b, the combination of data corrections and the use of 
appropriate cyclical comparisons eliminate the apparently above-average 
performance of the 1990s.  On measures of output, partial productivity and 
multifactor productivity, performance since 1988-89 has been:  very close to the 
average for the period since 1964-65; better than the 1980s; but slightly worse 
than the ‘golden age‘ up to 1973-74. 
Conclusions about economic performance in the 1990s are, however, quite 
sensitive to cyclical timing.  The correspondence between productivity cycles and 
business cycles is close, but not exact.  The Melbourne Institute (2001) estimates 
that the relevant cyclical peak occurred in either November 1989 (growth cycle 
measure) or December 1999 (classical cycle measure).  This is significant because 
1989-90 was a year of moderate output growth but very poor capital productivity 
growth.  If 1989-90 is shifted from the 1990s cycle to the 1980s cycle, estimated 
MFP growth for the 1980s is reduced to 0.4 per cent, and estimated MFP growth 
for the 1990s is increased to 1.4 per cent, strengthening the case for an economic 
‘miracle’.   
For the period 1964-65 to 1973-74, the classical cycle measure presented by 
the Melbourne Institute confirms this view.  However, the Institute’s growth cycle 
series includes three cycles over this period from 8/1960 to 4/1965, 4/1965 to 
1/1971 and 1/1971 to 2/1974.  Although the growth cycles do not match the ABS 
productivity cycles exactly, combining the two growth cycles from 4/1965 to 
2/1974 and the two productivity cycles from 1964-65 to 1972-73 gives a 
reasonably good match. 
The estimates presented in Table 1b are consistent with the results of 
Dowrick (2000) that are also based on the revised data set.  Other procedures, not 
based on complete business cycles, yield different results. 
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Gruen and Stevens (2000) address the problem of cyclical timing by 
comparing expansions.  In principle, this procedure is unbiased, but is inefficient 
because the information associated with contractions is discarded.  In practice, the 
comparison is biased in favour of the expansion that followed the deepest 
contraction, namely that of the 1990s.   
Parham (2000) relies primarily on the ABS productivity cycles in his formal 
analysis.  However, his graphical presentation of the data is biased in favour of the 
hypothesis that performance has improved in the 1990s.  A peak-to-peak trend for 
the 1970s is compared with a peak-to-trough trend for the 1980s and a trough-to-
peak trend for the 1990s, as shown in Figure 3 from Parham (2000), reproduced 
below as Figure 1.  The effect is to bias the trend growth line downwards for 
the 1980s and upwards for the 1990s. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Multifactor Productivity (Market Sector) 1964-65 to 1998-99 
(Index 1997-98 = 100, log scale) 
1959-60 1965-66 1971-72 1977-78 1983-84 1989-90 1995-96
110
100
90
80
70
60
Source:  Parham (2000:Figure 3) 
 
 
The effect of the revision may also be seen by comparing estimates of the 
relationship between the capital–labour ratio and the output–labour ratio.  Figure 
2a, from Parham (1999) shows a clear structural break in the relationship after 
1990-1.  Figure 2b, from Parham (2000) is also drawn to show a structural break, 
but casual inspection suggests the alternative hypothesis of a linear trend over the 
period 1974–2000, with no structural break apart from the secular decline at the 
end of the ‘golden age’.  Statistical evidence on this point is indecisive. 
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The final objection raised by Quiggin (1999a), and expanded by Quiggin (2000), 
relates to the measurement of labour input.  Two issues arise here.  The first relates 
to the construction of estimates of market sector output and employment by the 
ABS.  The ABS confines attention to those sectors for which a reliable measure of 
market output is available.  In particular, this excludes the property and business 
services (PBS) sector.  However, since most of the output of the PBS sector consists 
of inputs to the market sector, any error in measurement of PBS output generates an 
equal and opposite error in measurements of value added in the market sector.  By 
assumption, outputs are set equal to inputs in the PBS sector and productivity 
growth is set to zero.  If these assumptions understate the level and growth of PBS 
productivity, there is a corresponding overstatement of productivity in the market 
sector.  Hence, the most reliable estimate of aggregate market sector output and 
productivity is obtained by adding the PBS sector to the market sector.  However, it 
should be noted that, to the extent that PBS output is consumed directly by 
households, this procedure may overcorrect the biases present in the standard 
measures. 
This adjustment is important because employment in the PBS sector grew by 
52 per cent during the expansion from 1993-4 to 1997-8.  The fact that this growth 
was primarily due to the outsourcing of a range of business services underlines the 
unreliability of estimates of productivity for the market sector that exclude PBS.  
Including PBS employment and output in the market sector reduces estimated 
annual labour productivity growth for the period 1993-94 to 1999-2000 from 3.1 
per cent to 2.4 per cent, but has little effect in other periods.   
Gruen and Stevens (2000) suggest an alternative procedure using estimates 
for the entire nonfarm sector.  This yields labour productivity growth rates of 2.0 
per cent (1970s expansion), 0.8 per cent (1980s) and 2.2 per cent (1990s) 
compared to 2.1 per cent, 1.4 per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively for the market 
sector over the same periods.  Whereas in the market sector data, labour 
productivity in the 1990s is clearly superior to that of the 1970s, for the non-farm 
sector as a whole there is almost no difference.  The main difference with the 
analysis presented above is that Gruen and Stevens find that the exclusion of PBS 
overstates productivity growth in the 1980s as well as in the 1990s.  The data set 
used by Gruen and Stevens (2000) may also be used to derive MFP estimates for 
the period since 1971, using data for the entire period, rather than expansions 
alone.2 The resulting MFP growth rates are 1.0 per cent (1971–81), 0.6 per cent 
(1981–89) and 1.2 per cent (1989–2000). 
The second issue involves work intensity and the measurement of labour 
input.  Quiggin (2000) argues that the intensity of work has increased throughout 
the period of microeconomic reform.  Work intensity can be increased on a 
number of margins.  First, the number of officially-measured hours at work can be 
increased.  During the 1990s, the ABS measure of working hours per full-time 
worker increased from 39 hours per week to 41 hours per week, an increase of 
around 5 per cent.  This increase was offset by an increase in the proportion of 
                                                     
2  I thank David Gruen for providing the data set. 
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part-time workers.  Changes in average working hours affect the measured labour 
input and are therefore taken into account in productivity calculations.   
The second margin on which work can be intensified is that of the difference 
between measured and actual hours of work.  An unmeasured increase in hours 
can arise from reductions in tea and lunch breaks, replacement of continuous shifts 
with split shifts, pressure to forgo leave entitlements, and so on.  Such unmeasured 
increases in inputs are not taken into account in productivity calculations. 
Changes that are likely to generate unmeasured increases in working hours 
have been demanded by employers in enterprise bargaining negotiations for the 
unionised workforce, and there is little doubt that similar changes have been 
imposed in workplaces not covered by enterprise bargaining (Australian Centre 
for Industrial Relations Research and Training, 1999).  Changes of this kind, 
referred to as increasing ‘flexibility’, have been presented as an important element 
of microeconomic reform on many occasions.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that they account for at least part of any measured productivity gains associated 
with reform. 
Roach (1998) argues that unmeasured increases in working hours have been a 
major source of bias in estimates of productivity growth in the United States.  
Australian estimates of working hours are based on individual surveys, unlike 
those in the United States, which are derived from surveys of establishments and 
thus likely to be more reliable.  Nevertheless, many of the biases identified by 
Roach are relevant to Australia. 
The third margin, and the most difficult to measure, is that of ‘pace of work’.  
Most employees report increases in work intensity and stress.  The Australian 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey undertaken in 1995 (Morehead et al., 
1997) found that a majority of employees reported increases in stress, work effort 
and pace of work over the previous year, while less than 10 per cent reported 
reductions in any of these variables.  This is consistent with evidence from the 
United Kingdom and some, though not all, other European countries (Green and 
McIntosh, 2001).  Moreover, Green and Macintosh observe that the increases in 
work intensity are associated with higher productivity (as would be expected) and 
are positively correlated with exposure to competition and with reductions in 
union density.  Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that at least some of any 
increase in productivity associated with microeconomic reform results from 
increased work intensity.  Increased work intensity may also be associated with 
unmeasured changes in output quality, particularly in the non-market sector where 
output is imputed rather than being measured directly. If measured labour input 
and measured outputs are unchanged, an increase in work intensity should be 
associated with higher output quality. However, where increases in work intensity 
are imposed through reductions in employment with no change in measured 
output, output quality will decline. 
The evidence of increasing work intensity resolves a number of puzzles that 
arise from the standard interpretation of the 1990s as a decade in which both 
labour productivity and total factor productivity increased rapidly.  The first 
puzzle is why employment growth has been weaker in the 1990s than in the 
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1980s.  The second is why, despite high unemployment, real wages have increased 
more in the 1990s than in the 1980s.  The third is why the aggregate rate of GDP 
growth has been no higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s.3 
The hypothesis of increased work intensity implies that effective labour input 
has grown more rapidly than measured hours of work, while productivity and 
wages per unit of effort have grown more slowly than measured productivity and 
hourly wages.  As with the revisions to the capital stock series noted above, 
adjustment of the estimated labour input to take account of increases in work 
effort would eliminate all the apparent paradoxes.   
Another issue in the measurement of labour input is that of composition 
effects.  The proportion of the labour force employed full-time has declined over 
the 1990s, with the decline being particularly evident among younger workers and 
less-qualified older workers.  Consequently, the full-time workforce now contains 
a higher proportion of prime-age and qualified workers.  Given the process of 
downsizing and selective attrition that has contributed to the contraction of full-
time employment, it is likely that remaining full-time workers also have 
unmeasured characteristics more favourable to productivity than those that have 
left the workforce.  As with increased work intensity, productivity growth from 
this source it is not sustainable. 
Finally, in assessing the growth performance of the 1990s, it is necessary to 
take account of sources of productivity growth other than microeconomic reform.  
These include, technological change, such as increased use of information 
technology and increased skills and experience in the workforce (human capital).  
The magnitude of technological change associated with information technology, 
and the extent to which a flexible economy has contributed to technological 
innovation, have been the subject of vigorous debate in the United States.  
However, technological change related to information technology is largely 
exogenous to Australia.  Hence, the only potential impact of microeconomic 
reform can be to accelerate the rate of adoption of technical innovations. 
As regards human capital, Australia’s performance in the 1990s is a subject 
of deep concern.  During the 1980s, measures of educational attainment, such as 
the rate of school completion, improved dramatically and contributed to higher 
levels of skills in the workforce of the 1990s.  Largely as a result of programs of 
microeconomic reform, rates of school completion declined in the 1990s (Quiggin, 
1999b).  Other things being equal, this can be expected to reduce economic 
growth in the future. 
In the short term, changes in the composition of the workforce can affect 
average productivity.  It is commonly argued that the depressed real wage growth 
associated with the Accord on Prices and Incomes during the 1980s led to 
increased employment growth and reduced labour productivity growth as less-
skilled workers were drawn into employment.  Conversely, the relatively weak 
                                                     
3  The average rate of GDP growth has been about 3.5 per cent in both decades. Growth 
in GDP per person was higher in the 1990s, but the rate of population growth should not 
have been an important constraint on growth in view of the sustained high unemployment 
that characterised the entire decade. 
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growth in employment (particularly full-time employment) during the 1990s 
might be associated with an increase in average skill levels and therefore in 
productivity. 
Concluding comments 
Claims that the Australian economy has experienced a productivity ‘miracle’ or 
entered a ‘new era’ have been made with increasing frequency and confidence 
since the late 1990s.  Krugman (1998), in his discussion of the Asian financial 
crisis, described Australia as the ‘miracle economy of the financial crisis’.  
Although this accolade referred to macroeconomic management, many Australian 
commentators attributed the successful management of the Asian crisis to the 
benefits of microeconomic reform, just as  the successful management of the 
‘banana republic’ crisis in 1986 had been attributed to the flexibility arising from 
financial deregulation. 
This optimistic view has been reflected in the titles of more formal 
assessments of Australia’s economic performance.  Bean (2000) assessed the 
'miraculous' performance of the Australian economy (quotation marks in original).  
Parham (1999) uses the term 'new economy' (no quotation marks in original) and 
claims that that ‘Productivity growth is faster now than in the so-called “Golden 
Age” of growth around the 1960s’. 
Similar claims have been made on behalf of many developed countries in the 
past twenty years.  A partial list includes Ireland, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.  Such claims 
typically appear over-optimistic in retrospect.  The performance of the OECD 
economies as a group remains significantly weaker than it was during the ‘golden 
age’ of the 1950s and 1960s, despite strong performances by particular economies 
in particular cycles.  In these circumstances it is appropriate to subject evidence of 
allegedly ‘miraculous’ performance to critical scrutiny. 
Claims of a fundamental improvement in Australia’s economic performance 
do not stand up to such scrutiny.  To summarise, when cyclical comparisons are 
made on a peak-to-peak basis, using revised ABS data, the productivity 
performance of the 1990s no longer appears miraculous, though it does exhibit 
some recovery from the very weak performance of the 1980s to levels comparable 
with those of the 1970s.  The recovery in the 1990s appears stronger, and the 
performance of the 1980s weaker, if the Melbourne Institute cycle dates are used 
in place of those derived from the ABS productivity data.  On the other hand, 
much of the apparent recovery arises from measurement errors associated with an 
inappropriate definition of the market sector and the failure to take account of 
increases in the effective labour input arising from unmeasured increases in 
working hours and work intensity.   
The claim that economic performance in the 1990s was comparable with that 
of the ‘golden age’ of the 1960s is inconsistent with the empirical evidence.  There 
is some evidence of a recovery in productivity growth from the very low levels of 
the 1980s.  However, in view of the difficulty of estimating changes in the 
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effective labour input, and the sensitivity of the outcomes to issues of cyclical 
timing, no firm conclusion can be drawn on this point. 
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